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Israel's Separation Wall: The Humanitarian Impact

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Category: Issue No. 87

Published: Friday, 22 June 2018 12:10

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Nabeel Kassis*

Israel's Separation Wall:

The Humanitarian Impact*

 

1. Israel's separation wall - a series of 8 meter high walls, barbed-wire fences, trenches, depth barriers and gates, presented by the Government of Israel(Gol) as a response to a security threat-is in fact an overt plan of expansion into and annexation of Palestinian territory.

The immediate effect of this wall is to add to the existing measures undertaken by the Gol within its policy of closure established throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory to control the movement of Palestinians and expand Israel's authority. The physical Wall complex is integrated into a larger system of barriers, including natural topographical features, the road network, fixed checkpoints, 'flying' checkpoints, dirt mounds, cement blocks and gates on secondary roads.[1] These methods of closure throughout the past three and a half years of Intifada have created severe hardships for the Palestinian people across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, the separation wall has only added to the difficulties already faced by the health, education, agriculture and social welfare sectors, as well as by the private business through its de facto annexation of Palestinian territory.

 General Access Restrictions

2. According to the Gol, 41 agricultural gates exist or are planned along the wall's trajectory. Their management and operation, however, have rendered them unreliable. Palestinians forced to travel through these gates complain of "erratic operating hours" and "arbitrary procedures." As a result, the delays associated with travel through the gates "have had significant impact on the daily routines of students, farmers, workers, and, more generally, on the livelihoods" of all inhabitants behind the separation wall.[2]

3. A greater problem exists for those residing between the Green Line - to the west and the separation wall - to the east. The establishment of the Closed Zone and an accompanying permit system requires Palestinians residing within the Closed Zone to obtain permits to live in their own homes, remain on their land, and to travel. Palestinians not residing in the Closed Zone but whose land, business, or work is situated inside the Closed Zone are also required to obtain permits. Distribution of permits by the Gol has been inconsistent, unpredictable and unreliable, and by mid-November 2003, as many as seventy-five percent of the Palestinians in some villages had not received access permits. For those that did, however, permit renewal is required shortly; permits were only provided for periods of one, three, six, or twelve months.[3]

 Health

4. As a result of construction, either actual or planned, from the village of Jalboun (in the West Bank's north-east corner) to Mas-ha (south of Qalqilya), and in the Jerusalem Envelope (the area directly to the north, south and east of Jerusalem and including sections of the wall north of Bethlehem), 26 primary health care clinics have been or will be wedged between the Green Line and the separation wall, or isolated by the depth barriers. Bearing in mind that primary health care encompasses services as diverse as immunization, curative services involving a general practitioner, laboratory services, family planning and dental care, and more technical services such as gynecology and obstetric care, and radiology units, the separation wall will create the "fragmentation of local health care networks and referral systems".[4]       

5. Specific problems that are currently found in the area from Zububa (the West Bank's northern most point) to Mas-ha focus upon access, and the increasing inaccessibility to "rapid and effective emergency care." The north-west cluster of Palestinian villages - the point of convergence between the Tulkarm and Jenin governorates - is particularly susceptible to movement restrictions as a result of the separation wall as it is now an isolated enclave between the Green Line and the separation wall. One Palestinian Authority Ministry of Health clinic is located within this enclave of approximately 4, 700 inhabitants. While inhabitants are technically still able to access health facilities outside the enclave through the gates found along the wall's trajectory, movement is difficult due to increased travel times and the irregular opening hours of the gates themselves. Similar problems can be found in the additional enclaves to the north and south of Qalqilya city. In the AI Dab'a cluster to the south of Qalqilya city, for example, the absence of a single health care facility is now a reality for a population of a little over 1,000 inhabitants.[5]

6. Throughout planned phases of the separation wall north of Ramallah and south of Bethlehem- areas largely devoid of construction thus far - a similar predicament will be faced by local inhabitants should construction proceed as planned, and according to (GoI) maps published in October 2003. Access to health services will be curtailed for those populations on either side of the separation wall. The wall's planned trajectory south and to the west of Bethlehem, and encompassing the Hebron governorate, for example, will ensure that ten Ministry of Health clinics, one United Nations Refugee and Works Agency (UNRWA) clinic and three non-government organization (NGO) clinics will be isolated between the Green Line and the separation wall.

7. Vaccination programs, conducted by the Ministry of Education through the existing school structure, are often undermined due to the access restrictions on ministry officials charged with project implementation at the time when vaccination programs must be implemented. Nevertheless, permits for those traveling to the areas between the Green Line and separation wall are sometimes provided at a later date.[6]

8. Mitigation against the negative consequences of the separation wall has been considered by the Ministry of Health, in addition to local and international health NGOs. Suggestions thus far largely build upon the lessons learnt by the health sector throughout three and a half years of Intifada and center upon common-sense strategies that seek to maximize the efficiency of existing infrastructures and capabilities. Some duplication of services is suggested, although to an extent that appears to be marginal, such as the establishment of birth centers in areas isolated by the wall. 7

 Education [8]

9. In the Tulkarm governorate, one village now lies between the Green Line and the separation wall. Khirbet Jubara, population 309, has 93 school students that are now obliged to travel through gates to reach their schools in Kfur Sur and Al Ras. Nevertheless, movement is difficult due to increased travel times and the irregular opening hours of the gates themselves. Indeed, these gates can not be deemed as a solution to the access restrictions created by the separation wall as schools are dependent upon strict operating hours. The Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Education, therefore, is in a difficult predicament. Much of the village is situated on "Area C," and while construction of a school could be considered a sensible option to alleviate the hardships of Khirbet Jubara's student population, any construction in Area C requires GoI authorization. The Ministry of Education, therefore, has devised a creative alternative: the introduction of caravans to the village to serve as makeshift classrooms. As for a teaching staff, Abu Hazem - the lone teacher residing in the village - may soon be responsible for the educational requirements of 93 school student.

10. The concentration of Palestinian villages lying between the Green Line and the wall in the Jenin governorate reveals additional concerns, both for the student and general populations. In Umm al Rihan, and prior to the commencement of wall construction, renovations began to an existing school - in Area C - in response to the requirements of natural growth and the increased demands upon the existing infrastructure. Construction work on a second story floor ceased, however, after the GoI forbade its continuation and a newly constructed roof was also demolished. While GoI officials are threatening to demolish the remainder of the structure as it currently stands, the requirements emanating from natural growth behind the separation wall remain. As communities grow, will their infrastructure be permitted to grow with them?

11. In the Qalqilya and Bethlehem governorates, access for teachers is particularly tenuous as is generally the case for other areas impacted by the separation wall. [9] Nevertheless, the problem is particularly acute in these two governorates as the schools are more dependent upon teachers that do not reside locally. While approximately half of the local teachers reside in the cluster of villages centered around Ras al Tira, south of Qalqilya city, the other half is obliged to cross the gates. This groups reports that their ability to access their schools changes from day to day and is usually in response to their altered security status which also changes on an increasing basis. In the Bethlehem governorate, approximately 450 teachers will soon have problems accessing seven isolated villages with a combined student population of 5,675.

12. The Jerusalem governorate perhaps sees the most dramatic impact of the separation wall upon the education sector in terms of access problems. Administratively divided into two sectors - Jerusalem and Dahiyat al Barid districts - by the Ministry of Education, the education sector in the Jerusalem governorate is now divided into five districts due to the movement restrictions created as a result of the Jerusalem Envelope.

13. Within the Jerusalem governorate the issue of access for teachers centers upon the possession of a Jerusalem I.D. card. Those who do not possess the "blue I.D." are no longer able to enter the Israeli-established Jerusalem municipal boundary. Schools within the municipal boundary, therefore, are now obliged to find 152 teachers who hold Jerusalem LD., and who would be willing to disrupt their daily existence to travel through the barrier. The problem becomes more acute when teachers must travel from their places of residence through the barrier at several points, as will ultimately be the case once construction of the Jerusalem Envelope is completed. A teacher living in Al Ram, for example, whose school is located in Al Jib literally across the street, will according to the Gol map released in October 2003, be obliged to cross the separation wall twice.

14. Mitigation to offset and counter the education impacts of the separation wall is currently being approached by the Ministry of Education in several ways. Reorganization of the locations where teachers currently work is underway; approximately 15,000 teachers out of approximately 34,000 in the Palestinian school system have been transferred to areas in closer proximity to their places of residence. Nevertheless, disruption to the academic year is a consequence of the movement restrictions created by the separation wall. For the students, the provision of study sheets seeks to lessen damage done by time spent away from the classroom. 

Agriculture

15. By August 2003, more than 124,323 dunums (31,081 acres) were requisitioned for separation wall construction. This consisted of 62, 623 dunums (15,656 acres) of olive trees, 18,522 dunums (4,631 acres) of cropland, 9, 800 dunums (2,450 acres) of pasture, 8, 008 dunums (2,002 acres) of citrus trees and 21, 002 dunums (5,251 acres) of additional privately owned land.[10] Of all the land requisitioned for the separation wall from Palestinian households, 95 percent was prime agricultural land. [11]

16. The Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Agriculture estimates that, as a result of separation wall construction, losses in agricultural production will total USD 28 million per year. Specifically, movement restrictions for the agricultural sector may result in an increase in transportation and unit costs. However, difficulties in transporting goods to markets may result in excess supplies in local markets thereby driving prices below their production cost. [12]

17. An expected consequence of land requisitioned for separation wall construction is the inevitable reduction in pasture and range land. As a result, a reduction in animal stock is expected. As for existing livestock, overgrazing may result, accompanied by an increase in fodder prices. [13]

18. Agricultural operations have been impacted to the extent that obtaining permits for farm  vehicles remains difficult. Access for farmers remains the greatest problem, however, and as a result, "cultivated trees and crops have perished, and produce has gone unharvested". Farmers impacted by the separation wall "fear they will ultimately lose title to their land if they cannot sustain its cultivation/productive use." [14]

19. The Ministry of Agriculture is currently attempting to counter and offset the agricultural impacts of the separation wall by providing cash aid to affected farmers in the Qalqilya and Tulkarm governorates. Based on farmers' holdings and agricultural activity, a farmer with a summer crop, for example, would receive USD 15 for each dunum planted. Owners of green houses would receive USD 50 for each structure and additional subsidies for seedlings, fertilizers and pesticides. [15]

20. Local and international NGOs are also attempting to mitigate the separation wall's consequences. The primary strategy seeks to maximize available plots of land for future use through land reclamation. As with all mitigation strategies throughout each sector, however, donor funds are required for their implementation. These funds, while welcome, represent an opportunity loss; instead of supporting emergency humanitarian relief, donor contributions could have instead been used for development. [16]

 Water Use and Management

21. Thirty-two groundwater wells are isolated between the Green Line and the separation wall, all as a result of construction from Zububa to Mas-ha. Concerns surrounding construction between Mas-ha and Ramallah center upon the area of recharge for the West Bank's western aquifer, shared with Israel. Should the Gol proceed with separation wall construction in this area as planned, it may impact upon Palestinian allocations of the shared water resources. Planned construction of the separation wall in the south-west and southern West Bank - based on the October 2003 GoI map - will not impact upon wells, although local springs in the Gush Etzion settlement bloc will be isolated between the Green Line and future separation wall. [17]

22. Additional water infrastructure has also been damaged throughout the course of separation wall construction. The Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee has estimated that more than 30, 000 meters of irrigation networks and water pipelines have been destroyed. [18]

23. The agriculture and water sectors are obviously inter-related; it has been estimated that once the western portion of the separation wall is complete, annual value of agricultural production is expected to fall by 22.8 percent. [19]

24. Loss of water resources is further impacted by the erratic operating hours of agricultural gates located throughout the separation wall's alignment. Following the loss of regular access to several wells, the village of Jayyous, for example, is now obliged to tanker in water from the neighboring village of Azzun. Nevertheless, a gate located between the two villages ensures that water deliveries are unreliable. Further worries for villagers in Baqa al Sharqiya stem from the loss of agricultural land and the inevitable decline in the use of their water resources. Concerns now center upon the possible requisition of the villager's agricultural wells by the Gol. [20]

25. The separation wall's impact upon water use and management is currently mitigated through reconstruction of damaged water infrastructure systems or by upgrading existing systems to cope with new demands. Nevertheless, the loss of an agricultural well for a farmer is a loss of an income generating asset; in these cases mitigation is largely impossible as the creation of new wells is forbidden without the approval of the occupying power. The loss of land under which the area of recharge lies for the West Bank's western aquifer, as would be the case should construction proceed between Mas-ha and Ramallah, would constitute a serious blow to the West Bank's water resources. Again, mitigation in this case is impossible; how does one compensate for the partial loss of access to an indigenous water supply?

 Private Sector: Industry, Trade and Investment

26. The separation wall's consequences for the private sector across the West Bank center primarily upon restrictions to the movement of goods; access problems will only ensure that goods become increasingly uncompetitive as a result of increased transportation costs and time spent waiting for goods to be moved. Trade and investment will suffer as a direct result.

27. While the exact economic impact of the separation wall - based on all phases currently in existence - has yet to be quantified, the private sector is under no illusions as to the wall's devastating consequences for economic enterprise across the West Bank, specifically, in agricultural, stone and marble, tourism, and manufacturing activities. 

Social Welfare

28. Individual cases of hardship: Cases have increased as a result of the separation wall's presence across the West Bank. The World Food Programme, WFP, is currently distributing food packages to approximately 25, 000 beneficiaries as part of the WFP's "Food for Work" and "Food for Training" programs, and as a result of the shortages that have, or will, occur due to the separation wall, either actual or planned, in villages across the Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalgilya and Salfit governorates.[21]

29. Loss of employment opportunities: While access to the Israeli labor market steadily diminished throughout the Intifada, access was totally lost for those residing in the Qalqilya, Tulkarm and Jenin governorates upon completion of the separation wall in these regions. As a result, population displacement of those possessing Israeli I.D.s and seeking employment opportunities across the Green Line has occurred. The following table examines this phenomenon in some of the villages located within the Jenin governorate. All are in direct proximity to the separation wall and have close relations with neighboring Palestinian villages inside Israel.

 Migration by Israeli ID Holders in the Jenin Governorate

30. As a result of the construction of the Jerusalem Envelope, population displacement estimates of Palestinians with Israeli I.D. cards to areas within the Israeli established Jerusalem municipal boundary total approximately 300 people per week, according to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.24 This is most likely out of considerations for continued access to employment, schools and health facilities.[25]

31. Restrictions on social activities: Statistics from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, PCBS, illustrate that 90.6 percent of households located to the west of the separation wall, and in the localities in which the separation wall passes, are affected by the wall's presence when they would like to visit relatives. This is the case for 63.5 percent of households living to the wall's east, for a total of 65.8 percent of households on either side of the wall.[26]

32. Loss of family incomes sufficient to deal with needs: PCBS statistics illustrate that as a result of separation wall construction, the income in 52.7 percent of households surveyed in the localities in which the separation wall passes was not sufficient to meet household needs, as opposed to just 15.1 percent prior to wall construction.[27]

33. Changes to employment: PCBS statistics illustrate that as a result of the separation wall, 21.9 percent of household members in households surveyed, in the localities in which the separation wall passes, changed their type of employment. Additionally, 8.7 percent of household members in households surveyed, in the localities in which the separation wall passes, changed their place of employment as a result of the separation wall. [28]

 Footnotes:

1. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Written Statement Submitted by Palestine to the International Court of Justice, Abridged Version, 30 January 2004, p. 66.

2. The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities: A Follow-up Report to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC), Update No. 3,30 November 2003, p. 9.

3. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Written Statement Submitted by Palestine to the International Court of Justice, Abridged Version, 30. January 2004, pp. 67-68.

4. Health and Segregation: the Impact of the Israeli Separation Wall on Access to Health Care Services, Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute, February 2004, p. 10.

5. Health and Segregation: the Impact of the Israeli Separation Wall on Access to Health Care Services, Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute, February 2004, pp; 10.52-53. 76.

6. Interview with Ali Manasra. Director-General for Field Operations and Administration and Itaf Hamad, assistant to the Deputy Minister, Ministry of Education, Ramallah, 4 April 2004.

7. Health and Segregation: The Impact of the Israeli Separation Wall on Access to Health Care Services, Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute, February 2004. p. 112.

8. The following information is based upon an interview with Ali Manasra, Director General for Field Operations and Administration, and Itaf Hamad, assistant to the Deputy Minister, Ministry of Education, Ramallah, 4 April 2004.

9. PCBS statistics illustrate that as a result of the separation wall, 56.2 percent of household members that are students in households surveyed, in the localities in which the separation wall passes, are now using alternative roads to reach their places of higher education. Additionally, 41.7 percent of household members who are teachers in households surveyed, in the localities in which the separation wall passes, are also using alternative roads to reach their places of higher education. Impact of the Separation Wall on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households in the Localities in which the Separation Wall Passes Through (October 2003), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2003, p.17.

PCBS statistics illustrate that as a result of the separation wall, 45.9 percent of household members that are students in households surveyed, in the localities in which the separation wall passes, are now using alternative roads to reach their schools. Additionally, 32.8 of household members who are teachers in households surveyed, in the localities in which the separation wall passes, are also using alternative roads to reach their schools. Impact of the Separation Wall on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households in the Localities in which the Separation Wall Passes Through (October 2003), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2003, p. 16.

10. Survey on the Impact of the Separation Wall on Localities Where it Passed Through, (2003), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, August 2003, p. 7. PCBS warns against using this information on the basis that "respondents usually intend [sic] to report incomplete information about the area of confiscated or shoveled land. Nevertheless, the information was used in Palestine's written submission to the ICJ). See p. 83 of the submission.

11. Impact of the Separation Wall on the Socio- Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households in the Localities in which the Separation Wall Passes Through (October 2003), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2003, p. 23.

12. The Apartheid Israeli Wall, A CD-ROM presentation by the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Agriculture, November 2003.

13. The Apartheid Israeli Wall, A CD-ROM presentation by the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Agriculture, November 2003.

14. The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities: A Follow-up Report to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC), Update No.3, 30 November 2003, p. 8.

15. The Apartheid Israeli Wall, A CD-ROM presentation by the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Agriculture, November 2003.

16. Land reclamation can include leveling, terracing and planting.

17. Interview with Dr. Ayman Rabi, Executive Manager, Palestinian Hydrology Group, Ar Ram, 9 March 2004 and 7 April 2004.

18. Needs Assessment Study and Proposed Intervention No.4, Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee, 2003. Quoted in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Written Statement Submitted by Palestine to the International Court of Justice, Abridged Version, 30 January 2004, p. 83.

19. Undermining Peace: Israel's Unilateral Segregation Plans in the Palestinian Territories, Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem, December 2003, quoted in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Written Statement Submitted by Palestine to the International Court of Justice, Abridged Version, 30 January 2004, p. 79.

20. The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities: A Follow-up Report to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC), Update No. 3,30 November 2003, p. 14.

21. Interview with Marc Regnault De La Mothe, Programme Officer, World Food Programme, Jerusalem, 24 March 2004.

22. The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities: A Follow-up Report to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC), Update No. I, 31 July 2003, p. 19.

23. Figures obtained from Small Area Population, 1997 - 2010, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

24. Nadav Shragai, "Palestinians Left Outside Jerusalem Fence are Moving Into Capital," Ha'aretz, 16 March 2004.

25. The Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier on Affected West Bank Communities: A Follow-up Report to the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Aid Coordination Committee LACC), Update No.2, 30 September 2003, pp. 14-21.

26. Impact of the Separation Wall on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households in the Localities in which the Separation Wall Passes Through (October 2003), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2003, p. 24.

27. Impact of the Separation Wall on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households in the Localities in which the Separation Wall Passes Through (October 2003), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2003, p. 19.

28. Impact of the Separation Wall on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households in the Localities in "which the Separation Wall Passes Through (October 2003), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2003, p. 18.